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ABSTRACT
We analysed the process of construction and connection to the electri-
cal grid of four Spanish nuclear power plants with different financial 
and technological foreign partners: those of Zorita (PWR by 
Westinghouse), Garoña (BWR by General Electric) and Vandellós I (GCR 
by EDF) (belonging to the first generation of atomic plants and produc-
ing electricity from 1969–72) and that of Trillo I (PWR by KWU, con-
nected in 1988). These four examples allow us to observe how the 
learning curve of nuclear engineering and the acquisition of skills by 
Spanish companies evolved. Progressively the domestic industry 
achieved higher levels of participation, fostered by the Ministry of 
Industry and Energy. When the atomic plants under construction were 
paralysed by the nuclear moratorium of 1984, and several other projects 
were abandoned by the utilities along the way, Spain had developed 
an industrial sector around the fabrication of service components and 
engineering for nuclear power plants to compete internationally.
1. Introduction
At the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s, the industrial sector in the U.S. made 
the construction of thermal plants producing nuclear power technically viable. From an 
economic and financial perspective, these large companies, led by the U.S. government, 
concluded a cycle of research and technological development that had consumed very large 
amounts of capital to unlock this new source of energy from nuclear fission. The time had 
come to profit from the investment. The opportunities for the nuclear power industry in the 
immense American market laid the foundation for its export to international markets that 
had few competitors at the time (Rubio-Varas & De la Torre, 2017). The European industrial 
powers (the United Kingdom, France and West Germany) were still very far from the capa-
bilities achieved by the American multinationals. This was recognized by Euratom when it 
was founded in 1957 (Armand et  al., 1957). As if this technological superiority was not 
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Table 1. Competitors with the u.s. for nuclear contracts circa 1980.
Country Vendor(s)








Canada* Atomic energy of Canada
italy Ansaldo
Fiat/Breda/sopren
Sources and notes: Holliday (1981, p. 4).
*these five countries received orders for nuclear power plant exports.
enough, the institutions that regulated nuclear energy internationally since 1945 granted 
the control over enriched uranium to the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This was the fuel for the 
type of reactor that finally prevailed. The post-war phase of protecting nuclear secrets was 
replaced by a dissemination phase. The peaceful uses of the atom became one of the banners 
of Cold War diplomacy. Access to this new technology that promised ‘endless prosperity’ 
had to be given to ‘friendly’ countries, which included the developed economies and those 
still in the process of development (Drogan, 2016; Hewlett & Holl, 1989; Krige, 2006).
Throughout the sixties, nuclear power underwent the passage from the laboratory to the 
market. Until 1980, thirty countries began building and operating commercial nuclear reac-
tors. One hundred were built within the United States by five North American manufacturers 
(General Electric (GE), Westinghouse (WESCO), Babcock & Wilcox (B & W), Combustion 
Engineering and Atomics International). Meanwhile, the Soviet Union would build another 
fifty reactors in its territory and in the countries of its political orbit. Yet the global sales of 
nuclear reactors constituted a tight market. Just about one hundred reactors were sold 
internationally between 1955 and 1980 (excluding sales by the Soviet Union), the rest were 
built domestically. By the early 1980s, a dozen companies competed with the U.S. multina-
tionals supplying the core elements of the reactor. But only a few of them could export 
projects beyond their own borders (see Table 1), in part because the U.S. multinationals that 
exported nuclear projects - GE and WESCO – had the full support of the U.S. economic 
diplomacy and the financial assistance of the Export-Import Bank (Rubio-Varas & De la 
Torre, 2017).
The construction and operation of nuclear power plants was a complex and hazardous 
technological challenge, within the reach of only a few countries. In fact, initial forecasts by 
American industry expected that few economies would be able to receive this new energy 
paradigm. But it could be a great business opportunity. Prior to the sale of a nuclear power 
plant, one had to evaluate the importing country’s capacity for receiving this almost unknown 
technology (technological absorption capacity) in terms of the country’s macroeconomic 
expectations (economic and financial capacity), the electricity production and consumption 
system (electrical grid), and the level of industrial development (Drogan, 2016).
None of these three characteristics presaged the emergence of General Franco’s dicta-
torship as one of the global nuclear industry’s main clients. However, Spain become an 
outstanding apprentice among a small group of developing countries that travelled the 
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path towards nuclear deployment, including Argentina, Brazil and Mexico in Latin America 
and India, South Korea and Taiwan in Asia. Spain was a pioneer among the early comers.
Between late 1968 and 1972, three commercial nuclear power plants were successfully 
connected to the Spanish electrical grid and laid the foundation for a very ambitious commit-
ment to nuclear energy and industry. The Spanish utilities envisaged more than 20 reactors 
to be in operation before 1985, which exceeded that planned by France, Japan or South Korea 
during the same period. In the early 1970s, American and European multinationals described 
the Spanish nuclear programme as the model to be followed by other countries in the inter-
national market (Nuclear Engineering International, 1972). In fact, two countries stand out as 
major clients for nuclear power reactors ordered internationally from 1955 to 1980: Spain with 
orders for 19 reactors and Japan with 15 (Rubio-Varas & De la Torre, 2016, p. 251).1
In the nuclear market pre-Chernobyl, Spain is an exceptional case: it combines a large 
number of supplying countries (USA, Germany and France) with a large number of alternative 
nuclear technologies (PWR, BWR and GCR). While other importing countries experimented 
with a variety of nuclear technologies (Italy and Japan also imported and connected three 
different types of reactors), they had fewer suppliers: Italy had only two supplying countries 
-UK and USA- while Japan only imported reactors from the USA. For its part, South Korea 
imported reactors from three different countries (the USA, France and Canada) but only two 
types of reactors (PWR and PHWR).2
In the pages that follow, we will analyse how was it possible for a country with a low level 
of industrial development to relatively quickly and successfully gain the knowledge and 
understanding of a complex and expensive technology purchased abroad. The main objec-
tive is to analyse how a developing country’s private electricity companies were able to build 
and connect nuclear power plants during the launch phase of this new form of energy, thus 
taking its place among the pioneers of its worldwide dissemination. The present study is 
particularly interested in considering the evolution of this knowledge and skill acquisition 
process in order to obtain a greater degree of responsibility in the management of nuclear 
power plant projects. This technological model, imported first from the U.S. and France and 
subsequently from West Germany, represents a successful experience by a nascent industry 
that created a business ecosystem with state support. It was a story parallel to the European 
industrial powers’ entry into the nuclear age under an idea that Euratom applied in 1957, 
which may be applied to the Spanish case: ‘scientific and technological knowledge can be 
borrowed, but industrial capacity one must create oneself’ (Armand et al., 1957).
From a historical perspective, our research addresses key issues in the economic and 
management literature, basically, how developing economies catch up with development 
countries and how organizations learn and develop the capabilities which led to create a 
competitive management. Industrial policy was decisive in this regard, since it established 
a path based on the objective of increasing participation by Spanish industrial and engi-
neering firms in nuclear power plant construction. Thus, they would be ‘learning by doing’ 
from the American and European multinationals.
Within the different phases of a nuclear project (Figure 1), we aim at understanding the 
strategies at a specific moment in time: the project development and the construction 
phases. The exercise proposed is simple. The goal is to estimate how much this nascent 
industry matured through the participation of Spanish companies in the operation of the 
nuclear programme. Hence, this study provides a comparative history of the execution of 
four of the ten nuclear projects eventually connected to the grid. In Spain, the story of the 
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sector occurs in a three-phase timeline. The first generation of nuclear power plants was 
connected to the grid between 1969 and 1972, the second generation was connected 
between 1973 and 1981, and the third and last generation was connected in 1988, four 
years after the nuclear moratorium decreed by the government. Thus, the pioneering exam-
ples of Zorita, Garoña (De la Torre & Rubio-Varas, 2018b) and Vandellós I (Sánchez-Sánchez, 
2017), which belong to the first generation (Romero de Pablos, 2019), are compared with 
that of Trillo I (Sanz Lafuente, 2017), the last nuclear plant connected to the grid in Spain. 
These nuclear projects contributed to the learning processes among multinationals, pro-
moters, and local manufacturers, managers and engineers but with differences given the 
timeframe and the nationalities of the multinationals taking the project’s lead. We analyse 
how a developing country was able to develop its own engineering and nuclear equipment 
manufacturing industries in a record time (knowledge-intensive, technologically-challeng-
ing sectors) with different actors (the State, engineers and managers, and firms and 
businessmen).
The article is organized in four sections plus this introduction. The second section provides 
some basic characteristics of the institutional framework and the industrial policy in which 
the nuclear programme was deployed in Spain. The process of executing the four power 
plant projects is detailed next, bearing in mind the relationships established between sup-
pliers and purchasers of nuclear technology, the implications of the selected technology 
and the role of chief executive officers (CEOs) in the endeavour’s success. The third section 
analyses levels of knowledge transfer and learning by Spanish nuclear engineers based on 
increased local participation in the engineering processes for building a nuclear power plant. 
Finally, some conclusions are offered.
2. The Spanish nuclear race: industrial policies and business strategies
The studies regarding the processes of technology transfer to developing countries contend 
that the key to success lies in the efficient access of the promoters to ‘engineering knowhow’. 
Directed by foreign engineering firms, companies in the host country have the opportunity 
to quickly absorb learning processes (Frewer & Altvater, 1977; Kaynak & Wells, 1990; 
Lamoreaux et al., 1999). Designing very capital-intensive large-scale infrastructure and/or 
industrial plants requires companies capable of assuming responsibility for the design, con-
struction and management of the mega-project, in addition to the transfer of learning pro-
cesses related to a new technology to its customers. Namely, the imported technology must 
be efficiently assimilated and thoroughly comprehended by the receiver. By the end of the 
project, the promoter must be able to manage and operate the activities of the new industrial 
plant, and even improve processes and products (Niosi et al., 1995). In any case, it is useful 
Figure 1. typical project cycle for a nuclear new build. 
Source: iAeA (2017:4).
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to distinguish between the ‘ability to use’ and the ‘ability to produce technology’ (Tell et al., 
2017). The construction and commissioning of a nuclear power plant is a clear example of 
this progression.
A distinct characteristic of the nuclear sector is that the time that elapsed between the 
theoretical tests of the atom and its industrial applications was exceptionally brief. In less 
than a decade, it had moved from the laboratory to the marketplace. A technology scarcely 
tested on a commercial scale set out to capture markets without sufficient empirical evidence 
regarding what the appropriate technological path could be. The market offered a diverse 
range of reactors, capital equipment and cooling systems (linked to the type of fuel and 
moderator), while the research centres continued to test new prototypes. To receive this 
technology transfer, it was essential for the host country to have a trained scientific com-
munity and a group of companies capable of taking on this challenge (Hewlett & Holl, 1989). 
Possibly the only certainty for the importing nations was that nuclear projects were difficult 
to finance without international capital participation.
For reasons related to the dictatorship’s military-industrial complex, between 1948 and 
1958, the Spanish government laid the foundation for the institutional framework that was 
to shape the nuclear power plant programme. On one hand, the Nuclear Energy Board (Junta 
de Energía Nuclear - JEN) developed a staff of experts to manage the country’s uranium 
resources and their future industrial applications in power plants. Some of these scientists 
were trained in European laboratories, although most scientists were trained in American 
laboratories (Rubio-Varas & De la Torre, 2018). On the other hand, the private electricity 
companies that handled the supply of the Spanish market and the industrial manufacturers 
quickly concluded that this new form of energy would generate business activities to be 
undertaken by the private sector. Managers and engineers were trained for that challenge. 
Consequently, political and business leaders in Franco’s Spain wanted to be among the 
economies that were pioneering commercial nuclear energy at a historical moment when 
the frontiers of knowledge were expanding rapidly (De la Torre, 2017; De la Torre & Rubio-
Varas, 2016). However, some uncertainties regarding what reactor model and fuel type 
(enriched uranium vs. natural uranium) should be selected still persisted in the early 1960s.3
This choice was extremely significant because it created a path of dependence on the 
connections between regulators, experts, businessmen, managers and policy-makers, 
namely, between the laboratories, industries, promoters, institutions and foreign multina-
tionals supplying engineering services and large capital equipment. The imported technol-
ogy that was selected had to align with the maturity level of the host economy and influenced 
the learning processes for building and, above all, maintaining a commercial power plant 
in operation. All of the actors agreed that a great opportunity had opened up for the indus-
trial development of nuclear equipment and that it also required a high degree of special-
ization. One of the methods for this strategy to be successful was the formation of joint 
ventures with engineering firms and consultants in the receiving country such that the local 
partner could assimilate the new knowledge. Nevertheless, this approach was not adopted 
at the beginning. The lack of sufficient business capabilities in Spain tilted the multinationals 
towards a different strategy in the first phase, based on the ‘turnkey contract’ model (De la 
Torre & Rubio-Varas, 2018a).
However, the learning curve also depended on political and business variables affecting 
both the technology sender and the receiver. Thus, from 1959–1964, General Franco’s 
6 J. DE LA TORRE ET AL.
dictatorship opted for an industrial and energy policy very favourable to foreign capital 
entry in order to accelerate economic development and enhance business capabilities 
through ‘learning by doing’ processes. That opening improved Franco’s Spain’s financial 
capacity, and then the Government sought the support of the ‘American friend’ and also of 
some European governments. Americans and Europeans began to compete for the Spanish 
nuclear energy market. The United States’ comparative advantages - unbeatable in its indus-
trial and financial terms - began to weaken towards the end of the 1960s. Governments, 
multinational companies in the sector, and power plant owners all had to respond to a 
dynamically changing environment in two phases.
The industrial policy applied by Minister López Bravo (1962–1969) managed to build 
power plants in record time, but with very modest contributions by Spanish companies. 
Steps had been taken to select manufacturers of capital equipment based on their share-
holder structures, but these measures were applied to few contracts. At least, the consul-
tants and engineering firms born in the 1950s were subcontracted and could therefore 
improve their skills by working with American and French partners. ‘Turnkey contracts’ 
provided full control to the primary contractor, who preferred foreign suppliers to Spanish 
firms to guarantee the high quality required. However, in addition, the Spanish electricity 
consortia wanted plants connected to the grid as soon as possible so they could start billing 
electricity to pay their debts and increase dividends; all these goals had been achieved by 
importing the American and French reactor models. The promoters did not have a priori 
incentives to improve the capabilities and quality of nuclear equipment of local manufac-
turers. These investments required significant capital and time to mature, while imports of 
capital equipment aggravated the chronic trade deficit. These arguments helped to pursue 
a new strategy starting in 1968 and they continuity in a second phase between 1969 
and 1974.4
The political will to achieve greater local participation by manufacturers and engineers 
spring boarded in the first National Energy Plan (Plan Energético Nacional – PEN). The new 
Minister of Industry and Energy, López de Letona (1969–1973), had a direct knowledge of 
the electronuclear lobby since he was on the Board of Counselors of the electricity company 
most involved in the nuclear power business - the Unión Eléctrica Madrileña [UEM].5 His 
activities in government were aimed at obtaining greater commitments from electricity 
utilities, as principal promoters of the nuclear program, with the industrial and services 
opportunities for Spanish companies. The institutional strategy had five broad elements (De 
la Torre, 2017):
1. launch a programme of privately owned and managed nuclear power plants as ambi-
tious as those of France, Japan or West Germany (22 GW before 1985);
2. use the public National Industrial Institute (Instituto Nacional de Industria - INI) hold-
ing company to lead a first-class industrial group that would manufacture excel-
lent-quality nuclear equipment, with private sector participation and associations 
with foreign technology multinationals [Equipamientos Nucleares, ENSA];6
3. with American technical support, guarantee the supply of ‘made in Spain’ nuclear fuel 
to all future power plants through a new company owned 60 per cent by the state and 
40 per cent by the major utilities [Empresa Nacional del Uranio SA, ENUSA];7
4. provide a new arsenal of financial support measures for nuclear promoters (tax ben-
efits, import tariff relief and direct subsidies);
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5. and no less important, grant a greater role to Spanish public and private engineering 
firms through the intensive use of joint ventures with foreign and domestic companies. 
The public sector merged its own firms into INITEC, whereas in the private side, 
Empresarios Agrupados was formed to assemble the Urquijo financial group’s technical 
and industrial services firms.8 Each would increase their capabilities by collaborating with 
the foreign engineering companies supplying the primary equipment for the plants.
The promoter thus began to play a more committed roll in the overall management of 
the projects, namely, establishing more direct control that should stimulate the two main 
areas of activity: the nuclear components industry and engineering services. A good example 
of this strategy was the 1972 alliance of all the major electricity companies in taking over 
majority ownership of Tecnatom, the top nuclear engineering firm for training simulators, 
safety, maintenance, and operations development. That was one of the keys to the progress 
of the second and third generations of nuclear power plants. Each of the promoters had 
their own engineering firm in order to gain control over the execution of projects in favour 
of the national companies.
In fact, any attempt to measure the so-called ‘local participation’ is controversial. The 
available data come from aggregated estimates by regulatory authorities and by the nuclear 
lobby. The intention was clear - to demonstrate the success of this strategy to ‘Spanishize’ 
the nuclear programme. These numbers can only be validated or discredited by accessing 
primary data sources. For now, they will be used to explain the level of success of this 
industrial policy, while clarifying several methodology questions and using some technical 
reports.
The government rules required the power plants acquired a certain percentage of equip-
ment manufactured in Spain, starting with 50 per cent established in 1969 by the National 
Electric Plan and increasing to 60 per cent in 1972, 65 per cent in 1977 and so on. This plan 
addressed the so-called ‘mixed manufacturing system’, which sought to replace imports of 
entire pieces of equipment (tested since 1960 by applying tariff discounts) by importing 
only ‘parts or components not manufactured in Spain’. This would ‘facilitate the transfer by 
foreign manufacturers of their licenses and knowledge’ to ‘local’ industry. The Ministries of 
Industry and Commerce would be in charge of controlling this infinitely bureaucratic pro-
cess for all aspects of capital equipment and would also be subject to the evolution of 
markets.9 Fluctuations in exchange rates or final prices unsettled by inflation affected cost 
accounting during the first oil crisis while the second generation of nuclear power plants 
was in full swing. In any case, this mixed manufacturing mechanism did produce an increase 
in the establishment of multinational subsidiaries or in technical assistance agreements 
between Spanish and foreign companies. This addressed the requirement for the percent-
age of product manufactured in Spain, although technological dependence on foreign 
entities persisted.
What do the numbers compiled by the sector suggest? Evaluated as a whole, a priori, it 
was a successful experience. According to the numbers in Table 2, the level of ‘local partic-
ipation’ of 43 per cent in the first stage (1964–72) increased to 67 per cent in the second 
(1972–82) and 81 per cent in the third (1977–1988). To explain this data, it is necessary to 1) 
explore the intrahistory of four of nuclear the power plants and 2) analyse the evolution and 
achievements of the learning and technology transfer processes.
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3. Nuclear technology suppliers and buyers: from laboratory to the 
marketplace
The Spanish electricity businessmen soon expressed their interest in taking over the atomic 
business. Fully aware of the industrial and financial challenge involved, the large companies, 
privately owned in Spain, decided to join together in two consortia to build power plants 
(CENUSA and NUCLENOR). The two consortia covered approximately three quarters of the 
Spanish electricity market. The leaders of these firms possessed a great deal of information 
about the United States’ export strategy, the international legal framework, and the Euratom 
plan for developing the nuclear industry in Europe’s Inner Six.10 In addition, these business 
leaders were confident that the Spanish economy would soon be liberalized to facilitate 
access to the international market for nuclear energy-related goods and services.
That change occurred from 1959–1963. By then, the nuclear lobby had a voice in the 
Spanish Atomic Forum (Foro Atómico Español), and the design of the first two commercial 
power plants was well advanced, with a third plant to be added. The focus was on supplying 
electricity to those parts of the country with rapidly expanding populations, urban areas, 
and industries. The urban areas of Madrid, Bilbao and Barcelona had levels of electricity 
consumption that year after year exceeded even the most optimistic demand forecasts 
(Figure 2). To meet these needs, the electricity companies had been investing in high-voltage 
distribution infrastructure. Meanwhile, American nuclear businesses had facilitated some 
institutional and business agreements that included U.S.-based training of Spanish techni-
cians as managers and nuclear engineers, a new profession at the time. This collaboration 
came to fruition through JEN, which had also extended to its counterparts in France, the 
United Kingdom and West Germany. This was in addition to exchanges with international 
nuclear organisms. The overriding need was to train personnel capable of operating a nuclear 
power plant.
3.1. Selection of a technology partner
Appendix 1 includes summarized information of the four power plants that will be analysed. 
Focusing on the so-called ‘first-generation’ plants (the Zorita, Garoña and Vandellós I plants), 
one common feature is that all three were developed under ‘turnkey’ project contracts. 
However, they chose different reactor technologies that, in turn, used different types of fuel 
(enriched uranium for Zorita and Garoña, natural uranium for Vandellós I). The Trillo I project 
Table 2. evolution of spanish industry’s participation (in %) in nuclear power plant 
construction from 1964–1988.
1964–72 1972–82 1977–88
1. Civil works 70 100 100
2. nuclear equipment 25 50 71
3. Assembly 83 100 100
4. engineering 60 80 90
5. staff training* – 80 100
6. other services** – 80 90
7. totAL 43 67 81
*includes training for plant start-up.
**Logistics and transportation for heavy equipment.
Source: Pascual (1981).
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represented some important innovations. It was the first bid in Spain won by the German 
nuclear industry (after losing for almost a decade to American proposals). Trillo was developed 
under a joint venture. In general, each project’s choice of technology depended mainly on 
the promoters and their various existing relationships with suppliers. Since the late 1940s, 
Spanish electricity producers had purchased equipment abroad for new thermal (coal or oil) 
and hydroelectric plants. Since 1949, bilateral agreements were in place with France for the 
exchange of electric power on both sides of the Pyrenees (Viguié, 2014). Some of the utilities 
were in turn shareholders of the multinationals’ subsidiaries for electricity generation machin-
ery and instruments that had been active in Spain since before the civil war. Similarly, the 
foreign presence in some boards of the big Spanish electricity and industrial companies 
strengthened the business network that existed prior to nuclear sales.11 That was one of the 
advantages of Westinghouse and General Electric (GE) in winning the Zorita and Garoña 
contracts, besides being the two most competitive commercial nuclear power giants.
There were also clearly political factors that explain the selection of the supplier. The 
network of contacts established with American nuclear agencies, the State Department and 
Exim Bank had pursued from the very beginning an opening-up of the Spanish market to 
the technology of U.S. multinationals. The JEN test reactor and the Zorita and Garoña plants 
were manifestations of the programme’s Americanization. Policy also played a role in the 
Vandellós I plant. The intervention of G. López-Bravo, the Minister of Industry, was critical for 
Figure 2. industrial electricity consumption by province in 1960 and location of the four nuclear plants 
discussed. 
Source: own elaboration based on data by Ministerio de industria (1961, p. 16–17).
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enabling private companies to participate in the initially state owned Spanish-French com-
pany called Hispano-Francesa de Energía Nuclear SA (HIFRENSA), created to manage 
Vandellós I project. Meanwhile, the French government’s nuclear energy-related marketing 
sought to show off ‘the grandeur’ of its exporting capabilities to the rest of the world by 
selling its first reactor manufactured by Électricité de France (EDF) and the French Atomic 
Energy Commission (Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique - CEA). Despite this, the two private 
firms that participated in the consortium, Fuerzas Eléctricas de Cataluña SA (FECSA) and 
Hidroeléctrica de Cataluña SA (HECSA), did not hide that they ‘were suspicious of French 
technology and preferred American reactors’ because of its lower costs and better prospects 
(De la Torre & Rubio-Varas, 2018b; Romero de Pablos, 2019; Sánchez-Sánchez, 2017). Similarly, 
the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission’s 1974 decision to temporarily suspend exports of 
enriched uranium ended up helping the Germans win the Trillo I contract (in addition to 
other technical and financial factors) (Sanz Lafuente, 2017). In every case, the economic 
diplomacy of some governments supported these transactions and facilitated the negotiation 
of contracts and access to external financing. Personal relationships also played a key role.
3.2. The role of the CEOs
Part of the success must be attributed to those who led the power plant projects. Their 
professional careers exhibit some common features and interesting nuances. Engineers by 
training, they led each project by taking on the multi-purpose functions of managers at the 
highest levels of management and administration. The CEO had to establish political and 
institutional contacts with national and international governments and nuclear energy enti-
ties, negotiate the commercial and financial aspects of the contract (responsible for heavy 
equipment and fuel purchases, and securing bank loans), and sometimes participate in the 
design and supervision of plant logistics (De la Torre et al., 2018). These engineers periodically 
visited foreign nuclear agencies and laboratories; received management training; toured 
nuclear component factories; participated in trade fairs and academic events; dealt with 
heads of state, ministers, bankers and multinational directors; evangelized for the new era 
of nuclear energy; and sat on the boards of other companies.
With some interesting nuances, the profiles of the four managers who led the four nuclear 
projects we analyse exhibit some common features that explain why their roles were essential.
All of them were effective managers associated with one of the three large nuclear energy 
consortia (Nuclenor, Cenusa and Hifrensa), with financial partners that represented some of 
the country’s largest banks (especially Banco Urquijo and Banco Hispano-Americano, which 
participated in three of the four power plants studied). In fact, the Urquijo Group acted as 
the pioneer of the business and ended up becoming the great promoter of the Spanish 
nuclear program. The careers of MacVeigh12 at Zorita, G. Cortines13 at Garoña and Hernández-
Rubio14 at Trillo I reveal technical backgrounds rooted in the industrial capital of engineering. 
All three had first-hand experience with the technological advances that were unfolding in 
the United States and Western Europe. They had participated in the large hydroelectric civil 
works and collaborated in some infrastructure projects connected to the Defence Agreement 
with the United States. Above all, they shared the conviction that the nuclear development 
would create an unprecedented industrial sector in Spain. The first two were among the 
main advocates for Spain’s Atomic Forum lobby and led new companies in the nuclear energy 
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business, including the engineering consultancies Tecnatom and Eptisa, in addition to 
Ibernuclear SA, which aimed to compete in the enriched uranium market. In 1969, Hernández-
Rubio ended up assuming the management and presidency of the Electric Union of Madrid 
(Unión Eléctrica Madrileña - UEM), becoming the factotum and main contact for the Germans 
in the Trillo I project.
Before taking over the Vandellós I project, Durán-Farell was a civil engineer who had 
gained experience as an efficient manager of the industrial and energy companies belonging 
to Banco Urquijo and Banco Hispano-Americano in Catalonia. His reputation and activism 
catapulted him into multiple management roles in that region. As an engineer in hydroelec-
tric dam construction, he held managerial responsibilities until being appointed CEO and 
ultimately president of HECSA. In 1961, he undertook the challenge of reviving Catalana de 
Gas y Electricidad SA, which enabled him to interact with French energy entrepreneurs and 
technocrats. As an executive of Maquinista Terrestre y Marítima SA since 1963, he signed an 
agreement with the Swiss firm Brown Boveri to manufacture machinery for thermal power 
plants and received capital investments from American engineering firm Foster Wheeler 
Iberia SA. The Barcelona Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Círculo de Economía, 
among other institutions, allowed him to raise investment capital and develop personal 
relationships with many medium and large entrepreneurs of the Catalan business world.15 
In short, Durán was a type of manager strongly linked to financial capital and multiple devel-
opment-related investment opportunities in which political connections with the Franco 
government were common. He even attempted once to be named Minister of Energy.
3.3. Project execution: from turnkey projects to joint ventures
In brief, all of the projects had to follow the same path (Figure 3): once the initial phases of 
design, location identification, selection of the supplier of the technological model and 
negotiation of permits, and securing loans and signing contracts were completed, the basic 
infrastructure and the main and auxiliary buildings were erected. Next was the mechanical 
and electrical engineering, in parallel with determining the logistics for receiving and install-
ing the large nuclear equipment (reactor, pressure vessel and turbo generator).
These tasks prepared everything for the nuclear engineering, which was the most complex 
activity because it consisted of receiving the fuel core, loading the reactor, fine-tuning the 
instruments and testing the nuclear fission chain reaction. This all led to the last step of 
transmitting power to the electrical grid. Throughout all of these activities, training was 
conducted for the staff of engineers and operators responsible for the last stage, starting 
up the plant to perform safely and effectively for final delivery to the promoter. Many of 
these tasks were being conducted for the first time in Spain and had a steep learning curve. 
Spanish technicians received training in domestic and foreign laboratories and in the power 
plants of suppliers already operating in the United States, France and Germany (or in Italy, 
where GE had already built a nuclear power plant). As soon as possible, they transitioned to 
the plant they were building and continued their learning.
The time elapsed between the start of construction and commercial energy generation 
was relatively fast for the first-generation plants, in contrast with the pace of the second- and 
third-generation plants (Figure 4). Trillo’s project took more than ten years to complete, 
whereas Zorita took less than half that time. Vandellós I took slightly more than six years and 
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Garoña almost seven years. A series of strictly technical factors can explain these differences. 
The most basic factor is the size of the plant and the speed with which the productive power 
of the reactors was expanded throughout the 1960s. The 153 MW capacity of the first plant 
was tripled by the following two plants (460 and 480 MW, respectively), whereas Trillo’s capac-
ity (1,030 MW) was in turn more than double that of those plants. Additionally, the initial 
size of all the plants was increased between the design phase and the bidding process. This 
was the product of an industry that very quickly moved laboratory innovations to the com-
mercial stage and of engineers convinced that it was a simple problem of scaling. The pru-
dence demonstrated by UEM in selecting a small commercial reactor that first enabled the 
learning process for a later leap to more powerful reactors was supplanted as soon as Zorita 
was connected to the grid in 1968 using a more ambitious alternative. The promoter was 
already anticipating two 1,000 MW reactors, the so-called Zorita II and III plants, which were 
superseded by Trillo’s project shortly thereafter.
The American and French strategies of executing ‘turnkey’ projects facilitated compliance 
with deadlines, although it constrained the learning process of Spanish engineering firms, 
if we compare it with the results in intensity of learning that the joint ventures would gen-
erate in the next phase. In addition, the use of components manufactured in Spain was less 
than desired. There could be no other way. In 1965, Spanish manufacturers were not able 
to produce high-technology capital equipment of the required quality. Additionally, that 
type of contract provided full control to the reactor supplier, who only subcontracted local 
companies for the civil engineering services and the mechanical and electrical assembly 
under the supervision of a foreign partner. As such, these circumstances relegated the 
Spanish consultancies to less important tasks.
Figure 3. Phases of the construction and commercial exploitation of nuclear power plants in spain. 
Source: own elaboration.
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The most conventional form of the ‘turnkey contract’ was implemented in the plants 
located in the Basque Country and Catalonia. GE decided that all phases of the Garoña project 
would be managed by GE Technical Services and by Ebasco, whose lead engineers special-
ized in nuclear services. The French strategy for Vandellós I was similar, although the Societé 
pour l’Industrie Atomique (SOCIA) consortium included a very diverse conglomerate of large 
construction, engineering and capital equipment firms. The Groupement pour l’Industrie 
Atomique (Indatom) and the Societé d’Études et d’Entreprises Nucléaires (SEEN) coordinated 
the project execution.16 In both cases, the primary equipment and the fuel core was assigned 
to American and French firms, respectively. Subcontracts with ‘Spanish’ firms (civil engineer-
ing, supplying electrical and mechanical equipment) were mostly with the Spanish subsid-
iaries of these same companies or with local firms receiving technical assistance from the 
supplier.
However, the approach differed in Zorita by granting a more important role to Spanish 
engineering firms. The promoter managed to get Westinghouse to trust that Tecnatom, a 
newly created consulting firm associated with UEM and Banco Urquijo, could be on site, 
participating in an admittedly minor role in all project phases with the support of the 
American company, Bechtel. A more ambitious goal was achieved through this minor par-
ticipation, turning the Zorita power plant into a learning centre for engineers and operators.17
In terms of final cost per megawatt of electricity, Table 3 reflects reasonably well the 
difficulties inherent in achieving economies of scale between the two American and the 
French plants. Although they are the same size, the French reactor’s nuclear power was 25 
per cent more expensive than GE’s power. However, the Garoña plant was 64 per cent over 
budget, compared to a 36 per cent budget overrun for Vandellós I.
Figure 4. execution time of the works in the spanish nPPs, 1964–88 (accumulated percentage).
Sources: own elaboration. De la torre and rubio-Varas (2018b); sánchez-sánchez (2017); sanz Lafuente 
(2017).
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Trillo NP  
(1980–88)
installed Capacity 150 MW  460 MW  480 MW 1.000 MW
Cost/MW 0.20 (0.27)  0.11 (0.20)  0.19 (0.25) 0.72 (not data)
Initial financing mill $ USA % mill $ USA % mill $ USA % mill $ USA %
nuclear equipment 19.0 62.3 70.7 76,9 26.2 50.1 451,1 61,9
Fuel 5.5 18.0 12.1 13,1 18.7 35.7 223,6 31,1
engineering services 6.0 19.7 9.0 9,7 7.4 14.2 52,8 7
Total 30.5 100 91.9 100 52.4 100 727,5 100
Note: in parenthesis the final costs per MW.
Source: AHeBe, ieMe, operaciones financieras, Cj. 1885 y 1973. Memorias de Hifrensa (vv. aa.), Archivo Municipal 
de trillo. Unión Eléctrica S.A. Anteproyecto 1974. Box 87. siemens Archives 54 Li/319 KWu-report (1981). März 
1981, n° 34. Partnerschaft grossgeschrieben. Pag. 2. De la torre & rubio-Varars, 2018a), sánchez-sánchez (2017) 
and sanz Lafuente (2017).
Finally, political and institutional factors yet again affected the speed with which the 
expectations of that first generation were fulfilled. The government granted various legal, 
industrial, financial, fiscal and commercial concessions to the promoters. The suppliers were 
eager to win contracts in foreign markets. International safety standards were still relatively 
weak, but the risk of accidents was deemed to be low. In addition, there was no social oppo-
sition where these first three energy installations were located, although there could hardly 
be any under the dictatorship. The delays in bringing Garoña and Vandellós I online were 
due to technical reasons (in the criticality and connection stages), since nuclear facilities of 
that size had never been built before in Europe.18
They all enjoyed magnificent financial circumstances. Throughout the 1960s, the strategy 
of the U.S. suppliers included the support of the U.S. government through the credit for 
American capital equipment exports provided by the Exim Bank. The credit terms included 
low interest rates and amortization that started when the nuclear power plant began pro-
ducing and selling electricity. The equipment and facilities not of American origin were 
covered with loans from the private banking sectors of the exporting countries and from 
local banks associated with the electricity companies (Chase Manhattan and Banco Urquijo 
for the Zorita plant and the GE Technical Services finance company and the banking con-
sortium of Banco Bilbao, Banco Vizcaya, Banco Santander, Banco Español de Crédito and 
Banco Central for the Garoña plant). The French government applied a similar approach for 
Vandellós I, paying for a financial package that supplied the almost entire installation with 
French equipment and services. Meanwhile, third parties turned for financing to the Smith 
Barney consortium in the U.S., bonds issued by the electricity companies and, to a lesser 
extent, the Urquijo-Hispano Group.
Trillo I epitomized that strategy of continuous training and ‘learning by doing’, in addition 
to the change in contract type. However, why did this plant take comparatively longer to 
build? Along with the problems of scaling the industrial and engineering processes (Ross & 
Staw, 1993), the political, institutional and financial factors were very significant in this case. 
The microhistory of this nuclear plant coincides with profound changes in nuclear manage-
ment in Spain and other countries since the mid-1970s. The advent of democracy in Spain 
meant that nuclear energy had to be debated and regulated under new terms that 
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incorporated the governance changes required by the IAEA. The creation of the Nuclear 
Safety Council (in 1981) involved reviewing and validating the programme, establishing 
new protocols and bureaucratic processes that were stricter than before. Safety regulation 
and management had become more demanding than it was before the Harrisburg accident 
and was tightened up even further afterwards. The IAEA safeguards (signed by Spain but 
which did not apply to French supplies) and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (which Spain 
only signed in December 1987) led to stricter controls over international sales of nuclear 
components for peaceful purposes to importing countries, due to the risk of military re-use. 
In addition, perceptions of nuclear-related risk had fomented anti-nuclear activism in the 
West. Finally, municipalities near nuclear facilities demanded financial compensation or, for 
example, opposed projects to store radioactive waste in their vicinity. Due to the newly 
regained freedom to unionize, plant workers went on strike to demand salary increases. 
Added to all of this was the uncertainty created by the nuclear moratorium declared by the 
Spanish government in 1984. Each one of these factors contributed to delays in the Trillo 
project (and to delays in other plants under construction in the early 1980s).19 However, 
there was an even greater disruptive factor that explains the reason for halting the nuclear 
programme. The promoters’ financial status had clearly deteriorated with the increase in 
interest rates and a very adverse exchange rate for the Spanish currency. Public banks in the 
U.S. withdrew from the nuclear power plant development business, creating an opening 
for public and private financing from Germany. Difficulties in obtaining and negotiating 
credit also delayed the completion of the Trillo project, the last plant built in Spain.
3.4. The hidden Spanish participation role: the ability to use technology
In any case, these four experiences served to improve the level of participation of Spanish 
companies in projects led by foreign multinationals (Table 2). However, it remains to be 
resolved to what extent this success data responded to the ability to use the transferred 
technology or, more importantly, to the ability to innovate and create technology manufac-
tured in Spain.
The main strengths in the level of ‘local participation’ were in non-nuclear areas such as 
civil works (concrete and metal structures for buildings and basic infrastructure), mechanical 
and electrical assembly, and engineering services for logistics and transportation. The 
Spanish parent companies had gained these three capabilities in their hydroelectric and 
thermal megaprojects, in addition to in other very technologically intensive sectors, such 
as the petrochemical industry, the steel industry and the electrical installations for large 
infrastructure (airports, ports and railroad networks, for example) (Gómez Mendoza et al., 
2007; Torres, 2009 and 2017). This trend continued in the ten years after 1972 and featured 
a high level of personnel training in Spanish facilities (Allones, 1977). The Spanish engineers 
of the main consultants explained it correctly. The forecasts for the last period aimed to 
consolidate these results. However, even though the percentages indicated high relative 
gains (from 25 per cent to 71 per cent in 20 years), the great weakness was in the amount 
of Spanish technology in the nuclear equipment. The mixed manufacturing system had 
managed to increase the nuclear components manufactured in Spain, although with uneven 
concentrations (Table 4). The Spanish industry had achieved an almost optimal level of 
participation in the mechanical, electronic, instrumentation and control components of a 
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Table 4. spanish participation in the components of a nuclear power 
plant, 1964–88.
nuclear equipment 1964–72* 1972–82 1977–88
2.1. reactor 5 33 60
2.2. turbo generator 15 35 45
2.3. Boiler and mechanical equipment 42 74 90
2.4. electronics, instrumentation and control 40 78 93
total participation 25 50 71
Source: Pascual (1981) for the second and third generations and the total for the 
first generation.
Note: (*)the breakouts of the numbers for 1964–72 are estimates by the authors 
based on Kaibel (1972), Allones (1977), Gutiérrez-Bernal (1977) and Cerrolaza et al. 
(1977).
power plant. The local participation in the two most complex and critical systems of a nuclear 
power plant - the reactor and the turbo generator – lagged far behind, although there were 
some increases.
This situation was expected. The steam generation system was subject to the strictest 
standards of certification, control and safety to avoid any incident resulting from the pro-
duction of nuclear energy. The industrial product had to be of the upmost quality to guar-
antee that the radiation, corrosion and instability of the materials subjected to extreme 
mechanical and thermal stress worked properly with minimal risk.
This was part of the most complex technology transfer in the history of American industry. 
From 1956–1968, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) developed a man-
ufacturer-specific quality certification code for the ‘Nuclear Age’ that was rolled out to the 
rest of the world starting in 1972. Basically, it consisted of three levels of high-to-low quality 
requirements, known as ASME Code III A, III B and C, and VIII (Asme Website). That same year, 
E. Kaibel, director of Sercobe (the national association for capital goods manufacturers) 
acknowledged that the Spanish equipment sector had never manufactured to the specifi-
cations required by Code III A, saying that the code was so demanding that they would 
require a ‘massive investment in production, testing and quality control facilities’ and ‘consid-
erable organizational changes so as to afford access to these inspection facilities at any stage 
of production’ (Kaibel, 1972). That is, Spain was still far from being able to manufacture the 
most complex components. The ENSA factory in Santander was planned to meet that objec-
tive, although production had to wait until 1978, with licenses from Westinghouse, GE and 
Siemens.20 As such, it would only be able to achieve this quality standard in the third gen-
eration of power plants.
The expectations for complying with the requirements of Codes III B & C seemed more 
achievable. After a decade of deploying the ‘mixed manufacturing system’, ‘it appears that 
Spanish industry has already built equipment to these standards’, referring to the secondary 
components of the reactor and turbo generator. Finally, at the beginning of the 1970s, 
Spanish industry was able to manufacture the other equipment (steam turbines, boilers and 
mechanical equipment, pumps, electrical and electronic equipment) because Code VIII was 
equivalent ‘to the standard for advanced chemical and petrochemical process plant and con-
ventional thermal power stations equipment’ (Kaibel, 1972). The committed business portfolio 
reached its maximum with each revision of the Electrical National Plan. Five years later, 
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Nuclear Engineering International was once again touting the progress in transferring of this 
know how to Spanish companies. The data reveal the persistence of this industrial duality 
in the weaknesses and strengths of nuclear equipment developed in the host country 
(Table 5).
The impact was clearly more positive in terms of the development of engineering 
services. The participation of Spanish consultants started at a high level. A total of 60 per 
cent participation in the first generation enabled this participation to grow to 80 per cent 
and 90 per cent in the next two generations (Table 3, above). In 1977, a group of nuclear 
engineers from INITEC, Sener and Empresarios Agrupados identified two influencing 
factors. First, the knowledge and experience gained in other energy facilities (electrical 
and petrochemical) and in other industrial installations deployed throughout the country 
during the years of developmentalism were applied in the nuclear sector. Second, stra-
tegic alliances with domestic and foreign partners (prompted by the government) 
enabled engineers to increase their competencies in each project and to rapidly assimilate 
the transferred technology. (Cerrolaza et al., 1977). How Spanish participation in the first 
three plants of Zorita, Garoña and Vandellós I was in areas of lower importance has already 
been discussed. The second generation further extended the close collaboration with 
foreign suppliers, culminating in the third generation. The Trillo I nuclear power plant 
was the first project in which the nuclear fission system was wholly assembled by Spanish 
service firms. In fact, at the end of the 1970s, some of them competed internationally in 
the nuclear services market. For instance, ENSA manufactured 40 per cent of the heavy 
components for Trillo and participated in the KWU nuclear projects in Argentina and West 
Germany in 1981.21 However, this did not prevent cooperation agreements from being 
reached.22
Table 5. spanish contribution to Mixed-manufacture equipment in 1977 by level 
of quality requirement of the technology (in percentage).
AsMe code %
Code iii A  1.  nuCLeAr steAM GenerAtinG systeM
Code iii A   1.1. steam generators 35
Code iii A   1.2. Vessel 48
Code iii A   1.3. internal parts 58
Code iii A   1.4. Pressurizers 62
Code iii A   1.5. Main pipework 62
Code iii A  2. GenerAL PiPeWorK & FittinGs 45
Code iii B&C  3.  storAGe BAtteries & Boron inJeCtions 
tAnKs
75
Code iii B&C  4.  sPeCiAL VALVes (filters, pipework) 54
Code Viii  5.  steAM turBines for nPs in 700–1250 MW range 38
Code Viii  6. AuXiLiAry steAM turBines 50
Code Viii  7.  eLeCtriCAL instALLAtions For nuCLeAr 
reACtors
60
Code Viii  8.  eLeCtriC GenerAtors for nPs in 700–1250 MW 
range
50
Sources: our own ellaboration by Allones (1977) and AsMe website.
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4. Conclusions
Sustaining the growth trajectory just described would be very complicated. The Spanish 
Nuclear planning was affected by international and local changes. Firstly, in 1970s the opti-
mist atomic race was ended. The negative impact started with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (from 1968), which restricted cooperation and transfer of nuclear materials to import-
ing countries. Later, the collapse of Bretton Woods (1971) affected the financing model. 
Shortly after, the oil crisis accelerated the nuclear energy programmes of many countries 
for a short period of time. The world market became more competitive with the entrance 
of Europe and Canada’s atomic industries in to the race to win new power plants contracts. 
Governments, multinationals companies in the sector, and private promoters all had to 
respond to such a rapid changing environment. In addition, the social pressures from social 
movements pushed companies for the application of new requirements for greater safety 
measures that increased costs at nuclear plants. This caused transformations in the national 
and international regulatory framework.23 Three Mile Island incident (1979) only accelerated 
this process.
All this meant changes in nuclear policies and in the decisions of the companies. And in 
both dimensions the geopolitical interests of the great powers and the viability of the atomic 
business were intermingled. The ‘Nuclear Suppliers Group’ (USA, Soviet Union, Canada, 
United Kingdom, France and Japan) was born in order to review the policy for nuclear exports 
to countries that were not signatories of the NPT after the atomic explosion in India in 1974.24 
Although at the bottom governments were also looking for a coordination agreement in 
the midst of commercial competition. That was the goal of the supplier conference that took 
place in London in late 1975.
In other words, the ‘Atoms for Peace’ model and its market features had sold out by the 
end of the 1970s. Those who knew it first-hand were the CEOs of the big atomic multina-
tionals. Theodore Stern,25 Executive Vice President of Nuclear Energy systems, at WESCO, 
called for a reassessment of U.S. International Nuclear Policy in December 1979. He identified 
an ‘erosion of our position of nuclear leadership’ because ‘Japan and the European commu-
nity are continuing to develop nuclear technology and the breeder reactor without the 
direction (…) of U.S.’. As a result, American allies around the world are becoming sceptical 
of the U.S. as a reliable supplier for the international nuclear market.
This erosion ‘hurts economically and politically’ the U.S. interest. It resulted in loss of orders 
for nuclear facilities to countries who have developed their own capabilities based on U.S. 
technology. ‘Every order of a NP lost to foreign competitor results in 30,000 man-years of 
employment of U.S. workers lost in 40 different states’. And the American balance of payments 
adversely affected by the lack of exported orders. All of which was accompanied by a less-
ening of American ability to develop and lead a consensus of nations in achieving mutual 
non-proliferation goals and policies. Stern called upon the Carter Administration to reassess 
its international policy on the energy needs of the world through five major points: 1) 
Recognize that some countries will need reprocessing of nuclear materials and the breeder 
reactor sooner than the U.S. will; 2) Improve the NTP Act based on the realities of the world; 
3) Strengthen the support of the IAEA and its efforts to improve international safeguards; 
4) Insure the procedures established to implement the President’s Executive Order ‘on the 
environmental effects of U.S. nuclear reactors exports are prudent, and not another obstacle 
in our nuclear relations with other countries’; and 5) Develop a reprocessing industry and 
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continue development of the breeder reactor for energy needs, and ‘to demonstrate to our 
allies this nation’s commitment to nuclear power as stated by the President’.26 In any case, 
the U.S. position had weakened in the face of foreign competition and changes in nuclear 
diplomacy.
And behind the political and economic problems were also issues of technology transfer 
and business organization. From the European perspective, the situation was viewed differ-
ently and introduced new explanatory factors. French Government was negotiating the sale 
of reprocessing plants to Pakistan, Iran and South Korea. West Germany nuclear industry 
was also expanding its business in Argentina and Brazil.27 It is true that none of those coun-
tries that bought nuclear technology was very reliable. Alongside the geopolitical dimension, 
a competitive shock was taking place.
This was recognized in a secret report by Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State for the Carter 
government. ‘There is virtually universal disagreement with the U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Act of 1978, particularly its retroactive provisions.28 In particular, Euratom countries and 
Japan felt this policy as an imposition of new conditions for nuclear trade, especially adverse 
for the advanced atomic industries. ‘As suppliers, their support is essential to restrain the 
spread of sensitive nuclear materials and technology to other countries and deal with 
would-be proliferators’. Spain was one of them.29
From 1977 the industrial crisis directly impacted the Spanish nuclear sector. The collapse 
in investment was manifested in labour regulations and the bankruptcy records of some 
companies, which was further exacerbated by the second oil crisis. In addition, Spain’s new 
democratic institutions revised the energy policy (and of the nuclear programme, in partic-
ular), bringing a new threat to the nuclear lobby. Meanwhile, financial risk increased due to 
the heavy debt incurred by the industry. Besides the Government had to solve the non-pro-
liferation problems associated with plutonium on the part of the Spanish military in an effort 
on nuclear weapons (Velarde, 2016). In 1978 the American State Department concluded 
that ‘Spain’s desire for closer ties with Western Europe’ and the likely entry into NATO are 
probable inhibiting factors on any Spanish decision to develop nuclear weapons’.30 But above 
all, the further development of Spain’s nuclear power program continued of large economic 
and energy significance in a country that remained dependent on outside sources of nuclear 
fuel, equipment and transfer knowledge.
In conclusion, the future of the Spanish nuclear program depended on internal and exter-
nal factors. Meanwhile, companies and engineering companies had learned to handle such 
complex technology. The 1984 nuclear moratorium by the socialist Government meant a 
significant reduction in planned nuclear power capacity and a bailout of the utilities that 
promoted the nuclear projects. Once the nuclear programme reached its apex in the late 
1980s, there was no longer any problem in terms of locally supplying services, nor in terms 
of the mechanical, electronic, instrumental and control installations. As we have shown with 
the examples of the Zorita, Garoña, Vandellos I and Trillo nuclear power plants, Spain had 
managed to be competitive in engineering processes, perfecting systems to assimilate equip-
ment and knowledge, on-site training of specialized personnel, development and improve-
ment of safety, and operational maintenance of those facilities.
Twenty years later, in 1998, one of those responsible for the policy of national participation 
in the nuclear industry, Francisco Pascual, acknowledged that ‘in specifically nuclear instru-
ments’ a quota of between 15 and 20 per cent of the total had been achieved. A small par-
ticipation, but ‘very important because it had allowed the industrial or service areas to 
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capture and adapt to nuclear quality’.31 These capabilities are what they had learned from 
the technology transferred from abroad and the ‘mixed manufacturing system’. There was 
still a weakness in the manufacture of the steam generation system - the hard core of nuclear 
fission. The clearest proof of this technological ceiling is that a Spanish commercial reactor 
was never designed or manufactured. In other words, through the strategy followed by 
Spanish companies and government to deal with the U.S., French and German nuclear man-
ufacturers, Spain managed to develop from the scratch the ‘ability to use’ but did not achieve 
the ‘ability to produce technology’. However, at least the service engineering companies 
embarked on a path of internationalization and Spaniards occupied positions of responsi-
bility in the multilateral nuclear organisms.
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 20. ASEPI, Ensa, Annual Reports, 1972–1989.
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over in 1983. PAAA B/72 129507 Fernschreiben aus Madrid 13.04.1983. Auswärtiges Amt 
(Brunner). Hier: Deutsch-spanische Kooperation im Kernenergiebereich. B 72/129507. Betr: 
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 22. Radkau (1990). In 1982 the agreement with General Electric was renewed, replacing the old 
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information on reactor technology, fuel and services. The agreement with Combustion 
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pag. 9–10. KWU-Report 1982 Weitere Kooperation mit GE und CE Oktober nº 37; and Informationen 
von Kernkraftwerkmarkt 15.1.1982
 23. Between 1970 and 1978 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission multiplied by 15 the control 
items in each nuclear power plant. Buchwald (1979), p.208.
 24. Burr (2014).
 25. He was a big expert of the sector. Mechanical Engineer at Foster Wheeler Cº, from 1958 he 
joined as technical director in the Atomic Department of WESCO. In 1966 he was named gen-
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 26. LASHHC, Westinghouse Electric Corp, Series X, Box 141, WENS Bulletin, 170.
 27. French ambassador expressed to Americans if it would be posible to restrict the flow of techni-
cal knowledge. NSA, U.S. Embassy Paris telegram 28641 to Department of State, ‘French view 
on Coordination of Nuclear Export Policy’, 29 November 1974. Secret. More details of French 
nuclear exports in Dänzel-Kantof and Torres (2013).
 28. Many nations with nuclear power programmes need assured access to uranium, enrichment 
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not wish to interfere with the nuclear programs of countries like UK France, FRG, and Japan 
that have special energy needs’. NSA, Memorandum for The President from Cyrus Vance, 
Nonproliferation Strategy for 1980 and Beyond, February 1980.
 29. ‘Since all of the prior contracts involve NPT or equivalent advanced countries (we are hopeful 
Spain will assume such non-proliferation obligations) and reprocessing in the UK or France, we 
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 30. NSA, Department of State Report about the ‘Dirty Dozen’, Broadening Our Approach to Non-
Proliferation. The countries included are Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, 
Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea and Spain. 04 Assitant Secretary of State for Politico-Military 
Affairs, 17 March 1978.
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